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propriate notice to all class members in such manner as the court
directs.8 9
Section 909 leaves room for experimentation by allowing the
court in its discretion to assess attorneys' fees, based on the reasonable value of legal services rendered, against the opponent of a
successful class. For public policy reasons, however, no reciprocal
provision allowing the court to assess attorneys' fees against a losing
class is included. 90
In sum, the new class action law portends significant change in
state litigation. Under the prior law, 9 1 with its restrictive judicial
interpretation, 92 group claimants were often denied access to the
courts. Now, claims involving environmental offenses, consumer
interests, civil rights, adhesion contracts, and other collective activities may be championed in class form. 3
The advantages of a class action are tripartite: economic, procedural, and psychological. 94 The latter is borne of the strength
which comes with numbers. For "[e]ven if the court is not impressed, a favorable public or political reaction may be impor96
tant. '95 The disadvantages focus around the potential for abuse.
An active judiciary, exercising its discretion 97 sagaciously in fashioning decisional guidelines, can obviate such potential.
ARTICLE 14-A - DAMAGE ACTIONS: EFFECT OF CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK

CPLR art. 14-A:

Legislature enacts comparative negligence statute.

The legislature has enacted a "comparative negligence" statthus abandoning the traditional rule of tort law that any

ute,9 8

89 Section 908 is virtually identical to its federal counterpart. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
For a discussion of the problems likely to be encountered were settlements allowed without
court approval, see Becker, supra note 73, at 997.
90 See Homburger, supra note 63, at 654. Class actions often are in the nature of "private
attorney general" suits. The public is interested in aiding those who represent economically
or socially disadvantaged groups. Id. See also Special Comm. Report, supra note 76, at 10. For
a discussion of the problems encountered by awarding attorneys' fees, see 7B MCKINNEY'S
CPLR 909, commentary at 71-72 (Supp. 1975), and Becker, supra note 73 at 997.
91 CPLR 1005, ch. 318, § 4, [1962] N.Y. Laws 2086.
92
See notes 61-63 and accompanying text supra.
"' See Fink, supra note 58, at 1.
942 WK&M
1005.06, at 10-64.
95
Id. at 10-66.
96 See generally Weinstein, supra note 82; Retail Merchants, supra note 77; Becker, supra
note 73.
97 The new article, leaving much to the discretion of the court, places great reliance
upon a strong and active judiciary. See Homburger, supra note 63, at 657. For a discussion of
the various hardships a class action places upon the courts, see Weinstein, supra note 82, at
300-02.
98 Ch. 69, § 1, [1975] N.Y. Laws 94 (McKinney). A comparative negligence statute had
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contributory negligence on the part of a plaintiff serves as a complete bar to recovery. 99 The newly enacted article 14-A extends the
application of the principles of comparative negligence to include
the dispute between the injured party and the tortfeasor, thus
completing the radical change in New York tort law begun by the
Court of Appeals in Dole v. Dow Chemical Go.'

The new law, applicable to "all causes of action accruing on or
after September first, nineteen hundred seventy-five," 10 1 establishes a "pure" form of comparative negligence allowing an injured
party to recover damages even if his own culpable conduct is
greater than that of the defendant.' 0 The amount of recovery,
been passed by the legislature in 1974, but was subsequently vetoed by the Governor. That
statute would have barred recovery by a plaintiff who was more than 50% negligent, as
opposed to the present statute which allows such a claimant a diminished recovery. For a
discussion of the reasons for the disapproval of the 1974 bill, see THIRTEENTH ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE TO THE LEGISLATURE ON THE CPLR, as appearing in
[19751 N.Y. Laws 1482 (McKinney).
The Court of Appeals has called for the passage of a comparative negligence law several
times in recent years, but has always refused to make such a change by judicial action,
declaring that such a complex issue was best left to the legislature. See, e.g., Codling v,Paglia,
32 N.Y.2d 330, 344-45, 298 N.E.2d 622, 630, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 471-72 (1973). In only three
states have the courts established a system of comparative negligence. See Kaatz v. State, 540
P.2d 1037 (Alas. 1975); Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 858 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). In most states, courts have
agreed that this was a matter best left to the legislature. See, e.g., Maki v. Frelk, 40 Ill.
2d 193,
239 N.E.2d 445 (1968); Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., 47 Wis. 2d 120, 177 N.W.2d 513
(1970); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 67, at 434-35 (4th ed. 1971); Comments on Maki v.
Frelk - Comparative v. ContributoryNegligence: Should the Court or LegislatureDecide?, 21 VAND,
L. REV. 889 (1968).
19Although the Court of Appeals had refused to change this rule of contributory
negligence, the courts have gone to great lengths in attempts to avoid its harsh effects. For
example, in Rossman v. La Grega, 28 N.Y.2d 300, 270 N.E.2d 313, 321 N.Y.S.2d 588 (1971),
the Court reversed a lower court decision which had found a plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The plaintiff had been struck by a car while he was standing on an
expressway at night attempting to divert traffic from a disabled car without using a light.
100 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). In Dole, the Court applied
comparative negligence principles in allowing proportionate contribution among joint
tortfeasors.
101CPLR 1413.
10
21d. 1411. There are three basic types of comparative negligence statutes: pure
comparative negligence, in which an injured party may recover, regardless of the proportion
of culpable conduct attributed to him; greater or less than comparative negligence, in which
an injured party may recover only if his share of the culpable conduct is less than either 50%
or 51% of the total culpable conduct; and slight-gross comparative negligence, in which an
injured party may recover if his negligence is slight and the defendant's is gross. For a fuller
discussion of these three types of comparative negligence, see C. HEFT & C. HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL §§ 1.30-.50 (1971); V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
43-82 (1974).
Most jurisdictions which have enacted comparative negligence statutes have chosen a
greater or less than system. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1764 (Supp. 1973); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (Supp. 1975); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-31 (Supp. 1974); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit.
14, § 156 (Supp. 1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1973); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 1-7.2 (Cum. Supp. 1975). A slight-gross system has been enacted in only two states, Nebraska
and South Dakota. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1964); S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 20-9-2
(1967). Pure comparative negligence has been established by statute in Mississippi, Rhode
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however, is diminished in proportion to the amount of culpable
conduct attributed to the injured party.' 0 3 And, the existence and
extent of any such culpable conduct is an affirmative defense to be
pleaded and proved by the party attempting to diminish damages.1 0 4 This abrogates the traditional New York rule which had
placed the burden of proving freedom from contributory negli0
gence upon the plaintiff.'

5

Evidently aware of the many controversial questions left unanswered by comparative negligence statutes in other jurisdictions, 0 6 the draftsmen of the New York statute sought to resolve
these controversies yet allow leeway for judicial creativity. Using
the term "culpable conduct,"' 0 7 the article is not limited to an
action for negligence, referring instead to "any action to recover
damages for personal injury, injury to property, or wrongful death
.... "08 Hence, the new rule is intended to apply to actions based
on breach of warranty or strict products liability, as well as to
actions based on a theory of negligence; indeed, it is intended to
apply to any action in which the claimant's culpable conduct will
affect his right to recover.' 0 9
Assumption of risk and contributory negligence are enumerated as examples of the type of culpable conduct which will diIsland, Washington, and Puerto Rico. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 9-20-4 (Supp. 1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.010 (Supp. 1974); P.R. LAws
ANN. tit. 31, § 5141 (1968). Georgia has a unique statute which denies recovery "[i]f the
plaintiff by ordinary care could have avoided the consequences to himself," but allows
diminished recovery in other situations. See GA. CODE ANN. § 105-603 (1968). Notably, in the
three states where a comparative negligence rule was judicially established, a pure form was
chosen. See note 98 supra.
The United States Supreme Court has recently established a system of pure comparative
negligence in maritime collision cases. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397
(1975). This decision abrogates the traditional American rule of maritime law, which had
provided for equal division of damages resulting from collisions in which both ships were at
fault. See The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1855).
'0 3 CPLR 1411.
'1d. 1412.
105 Although the rule itself was never judicially abrogated, courts have occasionally gone
to great lengths to avoid unjust results. Thus, in Wartels v. County Asphalt, Inc., 29 N.Y.2d
372, 278 N.E.2d 627, 328 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1972), the Court of Appeals reversed a lower court
decision and upheld a verdict in favor of a party who, due to amnesia, had been unable to
offer proof of freedom from contributory negligence.
' For a discussion of the problems raised by the adoption of comparative negligence
statutes in other jurisdictions, see Schwartz, Comparative Negligence, 20 PR.c. LAW., Nov.
1974,0 at 13.
1 7 CPLR 1411.
108
Id.
0
1 9 See THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE TO THE LEGISLATURE

ON THE CPLR, as appearingin [1975] N.Y. Laws 1483, 1484 (McKinney). For a discussion of
the uncertainty in other jurisdictions regarding the applicability of comparative negligence
principles to breach of warranty and strict products liability actions, see Schwartz, Comparative Negligence, 20 PRc. LAw., Nov. 1974, at 13, 24-25.
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minish, but not bar, recovery. 110 The express inclusion of the
former is clearly intended to avoid much of the uncertainty which
has resulted in jurisdictions in which the comparative negligence
statutes do not specifically treat assumption of risk."' The use of
the open ended term "culpable conduct" indicates the intended
application of the statute to any situation in which a plaintiffs
conduct, not necessarily involving either contributory negligence or
assumption of risk, would previously have barred recovery. Such a
in a breach of warranty or strict
situation might arise, for example,
1 12
action.
liability
products
Although article 14-A does not specifically abolish the mitigating doctrine of last clear chance, such is the logical consequence of
the abrogation of the contributory negligence rule. The courts
have consistently applied this doctrine only when contributory negligence has been claimed as a bar to recovery. 113 Since contributory
negligence no longer bars recovery, the doctrine of last clear
chance presumably will no longer be applied. Thus, express abolition of the doctrine was deemed unnecessary by the article's
14
draftsmen.'
110

CPLR 1411.

111 The effect of comparative negligence statutes on the doctrine of assumption of risk

has varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and has created a great deal of confusion. Much
of this confusion may be due to the fact that although, prior to comparative negligence
statutes, most courts agreed that assumption of risk barred recovery completely, there was
little agreement as to just what assumption of risk entailed. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 68 (4th ed. 1971). Professor Prosser has distinguished three distinct situations in
which the term is used: (1) the plaintiff expressly assumes a known risk by agreeing to
relieve the defendant of some duty of care owed to the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff impliedly
assumes a known risk by entering "into some relation with the defendant, with knowledge
that the defendant will not protect him against the risk;" and (3) the plaintiff voluntarily
encounters a known risk already created by the defendant. Id. at 440. The effect of
comparative negligence on assumption of risk will largely depend on the meaning given to
the term in a particular jurisdiction. See, e.g., Braswell v. Economy Supply Co., 281 So. 2d
669 (Miss. 1973) (assumption of risk retained as a complete bar only when it can be dearly
distinguished from contributory negligence); Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 44 U.S.L.W. 2054
(Sup. Ct. Tex., July 9, 1975) (implicit assumption of risk abolished in negligence actions);
Gilson v. Drees Bros., 19 Wis. 2d 252, 120 N.W.2d 63 (1963) (implicit assumption of risk
abolished, while express assumption of risk retained); Schwartz, Comparative Negligence, 20
PRac. LAw., Nov. 1974, at 13, 22-24; Comment, Voluntary Assumption of Risk and the Texas
Comparative Negligence Statute, 26 BAYLOR L. REv. 543 (1974); Comment, Torts: Comparative
Negligence & Implied Assumption of Risk =Injustice, 27 OKLA. L. REv. 549 (1974); Comment,
Comparative Negligence Legislation: Continuing Controversy Over the Doctrine of Assumption of the
Oregon, 53 ORE. L. REv. 79 (1973).
Risk 1in
12
See THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE TO THE LEGISLATURE

ON THE CPLR, as appearingin [1975] N.Y. Laws 1484-86 (McKinney). For example, culpable
conduct might include misuse of a product. See, e.g., Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298
N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973).
113 See, e.g., Polk v. New York Cent. R.R., 10 App. Div. 2d 703, 198 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1st
Dep't) (per curiam), aff'd mem., 8 N.Y.2d 1106, 171 N.E.2d 873, 209 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1960).
I" See THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE TO THE LEGISLATURE

ON THE CPLR, as appearing in [1975] N.Y. Laws 1488 (McKinney).
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Recoverable damages are to be diminished "in the proportion
which the culpable conduct attributable to the claimant or decedent
bears to the culpable conduct which caused the damages."' 15 This
language indicates that, in a multiparty situation, damages recoverable by the claimant will be his total damages minus a percentage of
the total damages, the particular percentage deducted being that
percentage of the total causal culpable conduct for which the
16
claimant is responsible, either directly or by legal imputation.
The claimant's culpable conduct is to be compared to the total
causal culpable conduct, rather than to the culpable conduct of a
particular defendant.1 7 The new law does not change existing
provisions for contribution between joint tortfeasors, 18 nor does it
change the present rule of joint and several liability among
tortfeasors.1 9
Consider, for example, a situation in which A has suffered
damages amounting to $10,000 and is found to have been responsible for 20 percent of the incident, B has suffered no damages and
is found to have been responsible for 10 percent of the incident, C
has suffered damages amounting to $100,000 and is found to have
been responsible for 40 percent of the incident, and D has suffered
no damages and is found to have been responsible for 30 percent
of the incident. B and D, having suffered no injury, obviously may
not recover anything. A may recover $8,000 in a suit against any
or all of the others. C, although the most culpable of the parties,
may recover $60,000 in a suit against any or all of the others.
Assuming that all parties are solvent and subject to the jurisdiction
of the court, the final result, after applying comparative negligence
and apportionment principles, would be: A liable to C for $20,000;
B liable to A for $1,000 and to C for $10,000; C liable to A for
$4,000; and D liable to A for $3,000 and to C for $30,000.
Although these results might seem somewhat unjust in this
rather extreme example in that B, who is the least culpable party, is
liable in toto for $11,000, whereas C, the most culpable party, is
liable for only $4,000; it must be remembered that C has suffered
additional unrecompensable damages of $40,000. The goal of the
new law is to distribute the total loss resulting from any particular
" 5 GPLR 1411.
'1 The new law is not intended to change or expand the scope of vicarious liability or
imputed negligence. THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE TO THE
LEGISLATURE ON THE CPLR, as appearing in [1975] N.Y. Laws 1486 (McKinney).
117 Id.

118
Id.
19

at 1487.
' Id. at 1486.
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incident in direct proportion to cupable causal responsibility.
Thus, out of total damages of $110,000 in the above hypothetical,
B, 10 percent responsible for the incident, will bear the burden of
10 percent of the damages resulting from the incident; whereas C,
40 percent responsible for the incident, will bear the responsibility
for 40 percent of the total damages. This result is clearly more
equitable than placing the entire burden of loss upon the injured
parties, as would have been the case under the traditional contributory negligence rule. Furthermore, since the amount of damages suffered by each party does not necessarily have any correlation with his responsibility for the incident, the fortuitious lack of
direct damages, although occasionally creating an illusion of inequity in an extreme case such as the one posited, is not and should
not be relevant to legal liability for the incident.
Article 14-A contains no provision for special verdicts or multiple judgments, both of which are designed to clarify the complex
awards which may be involved in multiparty comparative negligence actions.1 20 The draftsmen apparently judged it better to
leave this matter to the discretion of the courts rather than to
mandate a special form in every case. 121 They did, however, indicate a clear intent that "a casualty insurance company representing
one of the parties not be permitted to set off against its obligation
under the policy of insurance, the judgment in favor of its insured
against the other party to the litigation."' 2 The frequent use of
special verdicts and multiple judgments will probably be necessary
23
in order to effectuate this intent.
In addition to enacting CPLR article 14-A, the legislature also
0

12 See id. at 1487.
121See id. at 1489. Several jurisdictions provide for special verdicts at the request of any
party. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-802 (Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-27-38 (Supp. 1975). A few jurisdictions require special verdicts or findings
of fact. See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111 (1973); ME. REv. STAT. ANN, tit, 14,
§ 156 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.2 (Supp. 1975).

"I THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE TO THE LEGISLATURE ON

THE CPLR,
as appearingin [1975] N.Y. Laws 1489 (McKinney).
123
See id. CPLR 3019(d) provides that a separate judgment for a counterclaim "may not
be had unless the court so orders." Thus, in a negligence case in which the defendant has
counterclaimed for his own injuries, only one judgment will normally be entered. Under
the old contributory negligence doctrine this presented no problem, since only the completely nonnegligent party could recover anything and there was no possibility of a setoff.
Under the new law, however, it is probable that both parties will be awarded a part of their
claim. A simple judgment in these circumstances would consist of the difference between the
amount awarded each party.
Clearly, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to show the existence and amount of any
setoff without the use of special verdicts and multiple judgments. Thus, in order to prevent
a setoff accruing to the advantage of an insurance company, special verdicts and multiple
judgments will often be required.
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amended EPTL sections 5-4.21?4 and 11-3.2(b)' 2 5 to bring them
into conformity with the new law. Section 5-4.2 states that in an
action for wrongful death "the contributory negligence of the decedent shall be a defense, to be pleaded and proved by the defendant,"'126 thus providing an exception to the traditional New York
rule requiring the plaintiff to prove his freedom from contributory
negligence. Section 11-3.2(b) provides the same exception for a
survival action when joined with a wrongful death action. 12 7 The new
amendments limit these exceptions to actions accruing before September 1, 1975,128 the effective date of CPLR article 14-A. 12 9 Any
such actions accruing after that date will be subject to the provisions of article 14-A.
One probable result of the new law will be a decrease in
negligence litigation. Since a negligent defendant will no longer be
able to escape all liability by proving contributory negligence on the
part of the plaintiff, but may anticipate at most some diminution of
damages, an increased number of settlements should result. More
significant, however, is the greater equity of the new law - an
injured party will no longer be completely barred from recovery
for injuries due only in part to his own negligence.
ARTICLE

78-

PROCEEDING AGAINST BODY OR OFFICER

Civic associationgranted standing to challenge zoning variance.
Recent judicial decisions, on both federal' 30 and state13 ' levels,
evince a trend towards a relaxation of restrictive requirements for
124 Ch. 69, § 2, [1975] N.Y. Laws 94 (McKinney).
125Ch. 69, § 3, [1975] N.Y. Laws 94-95 (McKinney).

126 EPTL 5-4.2 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
127
1d. 11-3.2(b).
128 Id. 5-4.2, 11-3.2(b).
129CPLR 1413.
130Under the early federal test for standing a plaintiff was required to show that a legal
interest or property right of his had been violated or was in danger of being violated.
Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939). A far more liberal test, however,
was enunciated in 1970 by Justice Douglas in the landmark decision of Association of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). The Court announced a bipartite
test: the plaintiff must demonstrate that he has suffered injury in fact, economic or otherwise, and that his interest is "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected ... by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Id. at 153. The Court further established
that the "interest, at times, may reflect 'aesthetic, conservational, and recreational' as well as
economic values." Id. at 154, quoting Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608,
616 (2d Cir. 1965).
This two-pronged test was criticized in New Hampshire Bankers Ass'n v. Nelson, 113
N.H. 127, 302 A.2d 810 (1973), wherein the court held that the injury in fact test should
alone be controlling. Id. at 128-29, 302 A.2d at 811. There is some disagreement, however,
as to the precise definition of injury in fact. Compare United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 683-90 (1973) (liberal approach

